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INTRODUCTION
If past is prologue, judicial independence will be as inspiring and as
contentious a constitutional ideal in the twenty-first century as it was during
the preceding centuries. Judicial independence was an aspiration among
Americans before the Constitution was first ratified. It was the focus of much
controversy in the colonies, and the pre-ratification experience with judges
heavily influenced the drafting of Article III of the Constitution. 1 Judicial
independence was obviously an objective of the Framers and the Ratifiers,
even though the Constitution provides various mechanisms for checking the
federal judiciary. 2 Subsequently, national political leaders, federal judges, and
scholars have sharply differed over the extent to which those mechanisms
limit, or are limited by, judicial independence.
∗

Samuel Ashe Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law & Director of Center on
Law and Government, University of North Carolina Law School. This Essay is adapted
from remarks delivered on April 22, 2006, for a panel on “The Independence of the
Judiciary,” at a symposium sponsored by the Boston University School of Law on “The
Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century.” I am grateful for the feedback from the
participants in our panel. Thanks also to Megan Busey for very helpful research assistance.
1 See PETER CHARLES HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635-1805, at
xi (1984).
2 The mechanisms for checking the federal judiciary include congressional regulation of
federal jurisdiction, impeachment and removal, the process for amending the Constitution,
abolishing inferior courts or seats on the Supreme Court, congressional budgeting of
financial and other support for the federal judiciary, and the appointment process for federal
judges.
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Among legal scholars and others, there has long been a spectrum of
viewpoints on judicial independence. At one end are the legal scholars who
view judicial independence as strictly procedural. In their view, judicial
independence is not a substantive ideal, but rather a function of whatever shape
the judiciary happens to have after national political leaders deploy all the
constitutional mechanisms for holding federal judges accountable. 3 At the
other end of the spectrum are the legal scholars who view the Constitution as
substantively protecting certain decision-making activities of judges from
political interference. In these scholars’ view, certain judicial functions are
constitutionally insulated, both individually and collectively, from direct
political retaliation. 4
In this Essay, I examine recent efforts to consolidate control over the federal
judiciary and try to determine where those efforts fit on the spectrum of views
on judicial independence. Analyzing the efforts of our leaders to influence
both the direction and composition of the federal judiciary should help us
better understand both their views on judicial independence and, more
importantly, the constitutional limits on their efforts to shape judicial
independence.
Indeed, recent efforts to influence judicial decision making reveal the
following four things. First, these efforts reflect a core belief that some leaders
apparently share, that there is a “right” way to judge and that any other ways of
judging are not just wrong but dangerous. Second, President Bush and the
Republican majority in the Senate have tried to reward and promote people
with the “right” approach to judging. Third, failures to enact proposals that
would strip jurisdiction over certain constitutional claims or require particular
approaches to judging are significant and not unusual. These failures reflect

3 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL.
L. REV. 315, 339 (1999) (arguing that judicial independence “is not an operative legal
concept, but rather a way of describing the consequences of legal arrangements”); Stephen
B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1677, 1679 (2004) (positing that judicial independence is simply what remains after the
interplay between Article III protections of the judiciary and congressional efforts to
influence the judiciary).
4 See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Regulating Judicial Misconduct and Divining “Good
Behavior” for Federal Judges, 87 MICH. L. REV. 765, 780 (1989) (insisting that “the
judiciary alone be responsible for regulating its own conduct short of impeachment,” and
thus maintain its independence); L. Ralph Mecham, Introduction to Mercer Law Review
Symposium on Federal Judicial Independence, 46 MERCER L. REV. 637, 638 (1995) (stating
that judicial independence is “the cornerstone of a free society and the rule of law”); Frances
Kahn Zemans, The Accountable Judge: Guardian of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L.
REV. 625, 631 (1999) (asserting that “an independent judiciary” is a “necessity” for the rule
of law); Calvin R. Massey, Rule of Law and the Age of Aquarius, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 757, 760
(1990) (book review) (reiterating the proposition that “‘[a]n independent judiciary is an
indispensable requirement of the rule of law’” (alteration in original) (quoting GEOFFREY DE
Q. WALKER, THE RULE OF LAW: FOUNDATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 29 (1988))).
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the persistent, implicit recognition of a norm to protect the decisional
independence of judges both individually and collectively. Fourth, a small
number of conservatives in Congress as well as the academy favor what I call
the strict liability theory of impeachment. 5 Perhaps most dramatically, this
vision helped to drive the most high-profile impeachment effort in the last
twenty-five years. Though not directed against a judge, the impeachment and
trial of President Clinton has some significant elements in common with recent
criticisms of judges in Congress (particularly the House) and academia today.
Interestingly, there is nothing new about the so-called strict liability theory of
impeachment, nor its problems.
This Essay consists of three parts. Each part examines the efforts of
national political leaders in different fora to consolidate control over the
judiciary, and each part includes a critical assessment of the implications of,
and constitutional authority for, those efforts. Part I focuses primarily on the
Senate, whose leaders and majority party have, at least until the fall of 2006,
attempted to shape public opinion on judging and to recast the confirmation
process. Part II focuses on the House, particularly on proposals considered by
the House Judiciary Committee to restrict federal jurisdiction over
constitutional claims relating to gay marriage, the Pledge of Allegiance, the
American flag, and public acknowledgments of G-d. The third and final part
focuses on the federal impeachment process. It describes the arguments of
some House members and a few conservative scholars in support of removing
federal judges for bad decisions. In opposition to these arguments, I suggest
that the most coherent and intellectually sound view of judicial independence
is a synthesis of all pertinent sources of constitutional meaning and
argumentation. 6 Arguments for the removal of judges for bad decisions fail to
do this, and are seriously flawed. I associate those flaws with what Akhil
Amar calls “blinkered textualism,” 7 and what I call blinkered constitutional
argumentation. The strict liability theory of impeachment, like the failed
efforts to legislatively prescribe what judges ought to do, depends on selective
readings of constitutional history. In fact, the Constitution protects the
independence of Article III judges in several ways. At the very least, it
protects them both individually and collectively from congressional legislation
retaliating against particular constitutional opinions, weakening or
5
As I explain both in this Essay and in previous writings, I understand the “strict liability
theory of impeachment” as requiring the removal of impeachable officials once they are
found to have violated particular standards of behavior or committed certain kinds of bad
acts. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Special Constitutional Structure of the Federal
Impeachment Process, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 245, 247-48 (2000).
6 For the conventional modes or sources of constitutional argumentation, see generally
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982).
7 Akhil Reed Amar, On Impeaching Presidents, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 291, 303 (1999)
(exemplifying the “blinkered textualist” as one who might contend, using a misguided
structural argument, that the words “high crimes” do not “mean something somewhat
different when applied to Presidents than when applied to other impeachable officers”).

1270

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:1267

undermining their exercise of basic constitutional duties, or allowing
impeachment or removal for mistaken decisions. These are a few, but not all,
of the features of the judicial independence guaranteed by the Constitution.
I.

THE NEW RHETORIC AND MORE

In this part, I examine some relatively recent efforts in the Senate to
consolidate control over the federal courts. I describe the essential elements of
these efforts and their underlying assumptions about federal judicial
independence.
A.

The New Rhetoric in the Senate

One of the most powerful weapons deployed against the Supreme Court, as
well as against some lower courts, has been rhetoric. The objective has
apparently been to build, or at least to maintain, support from certain
constituencies for appointing certain kinds of judges and for thwarting the
appointments of judges who are not committed to the “right” kind of judging.
This rhetoric can be found in at least three places – the proceedings for lower
court nominees, the fight over “the nuclear option,” and the confirmation
proceedings for President Bush’s Supreme Court nominees.
As of October 2006, President Bush had nominated over 250 people to
Article III judgeships. 8 In making these nominations, President Bush cited
their credentials as one important criterion. He did not speak of, nor defend,
their judicial philosophies in specific terms. At most, his nominees shared a
commitment to “interpret the laws,” not to make the law or “legislate from the
bench.” 9 His apparent strategy was to put the burden on Democrats to infer
any problematic ideological or jurisprudential commitments. While Democrats

8 S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 109TH CONG., JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT ON
NOMINEES (2006) (compiled by Sen. Arlen Specter) [hereinafter JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
REPORT ON NOMINEES], available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/nominations.cfm.
9 See Remarks Announcing the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr., To Be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1625,
1626 (Oct. 31, 2005) [hereinafter Alito Nomination] (commending Alito for
“understand[ing] that judges are to interpret the laws, not to impose their preferences”);
Remarks Announcing the Nomination of Harriet E. Miers To Be an Associate Justice of the
United States Supreme Court, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1487, 1488 (Oct. 3, 2005)
[hereinafter Miers Nomination] (“Harriet Miers will strictly interpret our Constitution and
laws. She will not legislate from the bench.”); Address to the Nation Announcing the
Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., To Be an Associate Justice of the United States
Supreme Court, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1192, 1192 (July 19, 2005) [hereinafter
Roberts Nomination] (stating that Roberts “will strictly apply the Constitution and laws, not
legislate from the bench”).
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succeeded in blocking a few nominees, the Senate confirmed the
overwhelming number of his lower court nominees. 10
The most heated rhetoric over judicial appointments can be found in the
fight over the Democrats’ use of the filibuster to block almost a dozen of
President Bush’s nominees to the federal courts of appeal. Democrats
primarily defended filibustering particular nominees on the ground that the
nominees had judicial ideologies well outside the mainstream of American
judges. 11 In supporting a radical effort to dismantle the Democratic filibuster,
known as either the constitutional or the “nuclear” option, Republican senators
defended the nominees as well-qualified and as committed to the right
approach to judging. 12
Of particular significance, the nominations of John Roberts (twice), Harriet
Miers, and Samuel Alito showcased the new rhetoric on judging. This rhetoric
apparently had at least three objectives – to make nominees politically
appealing, to steer attention away from their judicial philosophy, and to use
code messages to keep important constituencies both informed and in line. I
explore each of these objectives in turn.
For at least half of 2005, the nation had the opportunity to witness a
remarkably rare event; for the first time in thirty-four years the Court had two
concurrent vacancies. Over the course of six months, the President, almost all
Republican senators, and the nominees under consideration frequently used the
same language to describe what they believed Supreme Court Justices ought to
do. Chief Justice Roberts spoke at the greatest length. He characterized his
approach to judging not in philosophical or ideological terms but rather in such
terms as judicial “modesty,” 13 “umpiring,” 14 and “bottom up” judging.15

10

See JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT ON NOMINEES, supra note 8 (reporting the
confirmation of 15 of 20 U.S. Circuit Court nominees and 35 of 59 U.S. District Court
nominees as of October 6, 2006).
11 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S4887, 4888 (daily ed. May 11, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy) (insisting that Democrats only block judicial nominees “who are so far out of the
mainstream that they have no place in our Federal judiciary”); Peter Wallsten, 2
Evangelicals Want To Strip Courts’ Funds, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2005, at A22 (discussing
the Democrats’ use of the filibuster to block nominees “who they believe are too extreme in
their views”).
12
See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S5551, 5557 (daily ed. May 20, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Cornyn) (“[A]ll we are talking about is trying to restore this 214 years of unbroken tradition
of providing an up-or-down vote for any nominee who enjoys bipartisan majority support in
this Chamber as this nominee, Priscilla Owen, does.”).
13 See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55
(2005) [hereinafter Roberts Hearing] (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.) (“[J]udges have to
have the modesty to be open in the decisional process to the considered views of their
colleagues on the bench.”).
14 See id. (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.) (“Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t
make the rules, they apply them.”).
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President Bush and Republican senators, particularly those on the Judiciary
Committee, echoed some of the same terms and employed others, in particular
referring often in positive terms to the nominees’ “character” 16 and “heart.” 17
Both as a candidate and when he was considering potential replacements for
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor, President Bush had promised to
appoint “strict constructionists” to the Court, 18 though he refrained from
describing his Supreme Court nominees in these terms. When announcing his
nominees, he described their commitment to “interpret the law” and not to
make it. 19 Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, and Harriet Miers
(President Bush’s second, ill-fated nominee to replace Justice O’Connor) all
promised, like every other Republican nominee to the Court for the past two
decades, to interpret, not to make, the law. 20
It is unlikely this rhetoric was happenstance. Indeed, the rhetoric arguably
furthered several important objectives. First, the rhetoric deflected public
discourse, particularly during the hearings, about the nominees’ judicial
ideologies. With fifty-five Republicans and forty-five Democrats in the
Senate, the President and the nominees’ supporters in the Senate knew that the
odds favored confirmation. With these numbers, President Bush had no
incentive to be forthcoming about any potentially troubling aspect of his
15 See id. at 159 (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.) (“I tend to look at the cases from the
bottom up rather than the top down.”).
16 See Alito Nomination, supra note 9, at 1625 (stating that Alito “is a man of enormous
character”); Miers Nomination, supra note 9, at 1488 (“I know her heart; I know her
character.”).
17 See Roberts Hearing, supra note 13, at 54 (statement of Sen. John Warner)
(applauding Roberts for “working on pro bono cases . . . out of the graciousness of his
heart”); Roberts Nomination, supra note 9, at 1192 (stating that Roberts “has a good heart”).
18 See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Can Bush Deliver a Conservative Supreme Court?, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2004, § 4, at 1 (reporting that President Bush, when asked at a press
conference about the sort of Justice he might nominate, answered “‘I would pick people
who would be strict constructionists’”); George W. Bush, The Second Bush-Kerry
Presidential Debate (Oct. 8, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.debates.org/pages/
trans2004c.html) (“I would pick people that would be strict constructionists.”); George W.
Bush, The First Gore-Bush Presidential Debate (Oct. 3, 2000) (transcript available at
http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2000a.html) (“I believe in strict constructionists. Those
are the kind of judges I will appoint.”).
19 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
20 See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. To Be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 342 (2006) [hereinafter Alito Hearing] (statement of Samuel
A. Alito, Jr.) (cautioning against “making policy judgments rather than interpreting the
law”); Roberts Hearing, supra note 13, at 158 (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.)
(describing the Court’s role as “interpreting the law, . . . not making policy”); Harriet E.
Miers, Remarks upon Supreme Court Nomination (Oct. 3, 2005) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051003.html) (promising to “help
ensure that the courts meet their obligations to strictly apply the laws and the Constitution”).
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nominees. Promoting the nominees on the basis of their judicial philosophy
would merely have invited trouble. At the same time, the solid majority of
Republicans in control of the Senate put the nearly impossible burden on the
Democrats to persuade the few uncommitted Republicans (as well as each
other) that the nominees were not just flawed but unacceptable.
Second, the rhetoric helped to make the nominees politically appealing.
Rather than describe themselves in any politically controversial or divisive
terms, the nominees and their supporters discussed their approaches to judging
in terms that had great appeal and were non-threatening. Moreover, the
rhetoric served to create an important new precedent in the confirmation
process. For some senators, such as Mike DeWine (R-Ohio), the successful
confirmations of the President’s Supreme Court nominees showed that
qualified conservatives, including outspoken critics of Roe v. Wade, 21 could be
appointed to the Supreme Court. 22 At the same time, the successful
confirmations of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito helped to bury the
Bork precedent. Many Republican senators have pointed to Bork’s rejection
by the Democrat-dominated Senate in 1987 as the watershed event in which
the confirmation process became improperly focused on nominees’ judicial
For years, Republican senators have wanted to put
philosophies. 23
confirmation proceedings of their nominees on less contentious grounds, such
as their basic qualifications.
Third, the rhetoric sent signals to important interest groups and leaders. To
many observers, the rhetoric made most sense as a code, the meaning of which
was plain to the President’s core constituencies. 24 It told supporters that the
nominees could be trusted to be the kinds of Justices that the President had
promised to appoint. President Bush’s nominees had, in other words, the right
kind of judicial commitments.
Fourth, the rhetoric reflected the shared conviction of many Republican
leaders that merely expressing the right kind of ideological commitments was
insufficient for a suitable Republican nominee. A nominee must have
ideological commitments that are firmly grounded, or anchored, in something
21

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See Kathy Kiely, Alito Nomination Tugs on Ties Binding Moderate ‘Gang of 14,’ USA
TODAY, Nov. 3, 2005, at 9A (reporting that Senator DeWine, responding to concerns that
Alito might vote to overturn Roe v. Wade, stated that “‘[t]his nominee should not have
shocked anyone . . . George Bush won the election’”); Bill Mears, Alito Denied That
Constitution Protected Abortion, CNN.COM, Nov. 14, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/
POLITICS/11/14/alito/index.html (highlighting a 1985 letter written by Alito stating that
“‘the Constitution does not protect a right to abortion’”).
23 See 151 CONG. REC. S5815, 5820 (daily ed. May 24, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham)
(arguing that Judge Bork “was attacked because of his philosophy, not because of his
qualifications”).
24 See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, The Crisis of the Bush Code, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9,
2005, § 4, at 1 (“The [Bush] administration relied on subtle clues about [Miers’] evangelical
faith . . . .”).
22
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immutable to change. President Bush, his advisors, and many Republican
senators wanted to avoid the mistakes made by President Reagan when he
appointed Justices Kennedy and O’Connor, and by President George H.W.
Bush when he appointed Justice Souter. 25 Character, heart, and even faith
were important as the solid, impermeable ground on which the nominees’
judicial attitudes were based.
Recall, for instance, that when first pressed by one evangelical about why
President Bush had nominated White House Counsel Harriet Miers to the
Court, Bush’s close advisor Karl Rove responded by mentioning her Christian
faith. 26 When President Bush was pushed by reporters to explain the
appointment, he talked about her “character” and about how well he knew her
“heart.” 27 His message was that he knew that nothing would divert her from
steadfastly remaining a strict constructionist on the court. Her faith, like that
of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, presumably reflected moral
commitments impervious to change. Ideology became a secondary (or
implicit) consideration, as long as the nominee held it in conjunction with, if
not in part because of, personal attributes completely resistant to liberal
influences.
B.

The New Rhetoric in Perspective

While conservatives achieved their immediate objectives through the
rhetoric they employed in the confirmation proceedings for Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito, some significant questions remain about both its
effectiveness and its implications for judicial independence.
First, the rhetoric plainly did not help Harriet Miers. Indeed, her nomination
met resistance, if not outright opposition, as soon as it was announced, from
several Republican senators who expressed concerns about whether she had a
sufficiently conservative judicial philosophy. 28 The nomination failed in part
because she lacked a record of long-term, rigid commitment to the kind of
judicial philosophy many Republican senators wanted Justice O’Connor’s

25 See Jason DeParle & David D. Kirkpatrick, In Battle To Pick Next Justice, Right Says
Avoid a Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2005, at A1 (reporting conservative disappointment
and anger over Justice Kennedy’s record on the Supreme Court, and stating that “since the
elevation of Earl Warren, Republican presidents have picked justices who disappoint the
Republican faithful”).
26 See Elisabeth Bumiller & David D. Kirkpatrick, Bush Criticized over Emphasis on
Religion of Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2005, at A23; White House Defends Talk of
Miers’ Religion, CNN.COM, Oct. 12, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/10/12/
miers.religion/index.html.
27 See Miers Nomination, supra note 9, at 1488.
28 See Conservatives Look Past Miers, CNN.COM, Oct. 28, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/
2005/POLITICS/10/28/scotus.next/index.html (reporting that some conservatives opposed
Miers’ nomination and were relieved that she chose to withdraw).
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replacement to have (and to hold). 29 The nomination also failed because of
serious questions about Miers’ qualifications. Many Republicans, as well as
many conservative commentators, questioned whether she had the necessary
experience, temperament, intelligence, and skill to handle the demanding and
important work of a Supreme Court Justice. 30 Ultimately, talking about her
“character,” “heart,” and “faith” failed to mask the deficiencies in her
qualifications. That the deficiencies included her lack of a demonstrated
commitment to the right kind of judicial ideology is telling.
Second, Chief Justice Roberts’ and Justice Alito’s appeal derived in part
from their having been well-known figures at the time of their respective
nominations to the Court. Well before their nominations to the Court, Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito enjoyed widespread reverence for their
professional accomplishments, particularly among conservative commentators
and interest groups. 31 They were both on almost every short list of preferred
candidates that conservative interest groups had assembled, due at least in part
to their records of long-standing commitment to conservative judicial
principles (and outcomes). This meant that once they were nominated, they
could expect the support of the political leaders and conservative
commentators who had previously lauded their credentials and jurisprudential
or ideological pedigrees. All that remained was closing the deal with the
Senate.
The new rhetoric employed in the hearings obscured, but did not entirely
eliminate, the inquiry into judicial philosophy. Neither Chief Justice Roberts’
nor Justice Alito’s judicial philosophy was a secret. Nor was it a secret that
each of the past three Republican administrations had put a premium on
judicial philosophy as an indispensable element of their nominees’
qualifications. Likewise, President Bush has not defined merit as distinct from

29

See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. S333, 344 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Leahy) (blaming Harriet Miers’ failed nomination on the fact that “her conservative
opponents were not confident that she would rule the way they wanted”); id. at 346
(statement of Sen. Reid) (expressing disappointment that “the radical rightwing torpedoed
the nomination of White House counsel Harriet Miers and insisted that someone with Sam
Alito’s ideology be put in her place”); CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS &
CONGRESS COLLIDE 206 (2006) (stating that conservatives “regarded the less qualified Miers
as a squandered opportunity for President Bush to name an established ideological
conservative to the Court”).
30 See David D. Kirkpatrick, In Alito, G.O.P. Reaps Harvest Planted in ’82, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 2006, at A1 (reporting that Bush’s conservative base “complained about [Miers’]
dearth of qualifications and ideological bona fides”).
31 See, e.g., Roberts Hearing, supra note 13, at 24 (statement of Sen. Herbert Kohl,
Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“Your legal talents are undeniably impressive.”); id.
at 149 (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“No one
doubts you have had a very impressive legal career thus far . . . .”); Jeffrey Rosen,
Obstruction of Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2002, § 6, at 38 (describing Roberts as one of
“the most respected appellate lawyers in Washington”).
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ideology; the two are merged in his and other Republican leaders’
calculations. 32
Third, the rhetoric is (mostly) new, but its objective is not. President Bush,
unlike his father and President Reagan, assiduously avoided attributing
particular judicial philosophies to his Supreme Court nominees. He did not
defend them on ideological terms; he promoted them on the basis of their
qualifications. 33 The focus on “character,” “heart,” “umpiring,” and judicial
“modesty” is a relatively new variation on an old theme (indeed, some scholars
have long pressed for the selection process to focus on the nominees’ moral
character rather than their political or judicial views). 34 Yet the effort to focus
confirmation hearings on safe, rather than controversial, subjects is hardly a
new political technique. American history is just as replete with efforts by
senators to steer attention away from a nominee’s vulnerable attributes or
records as it is with controversy over the direction in which a new nominee
will take the Court. 35
Fourth, the new rhetoric did not fully dominate public discourse, even
within the Senate, when President Bush announced his Supreme Court
nominees. The Democrats on the Judiciary Committee asked probing

32

See Michael J. Gerhardt, Merit vs. Ideology, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 353, 357 (2005).
See, e.g., Remarks Following a Meeting with Former Texas Supreme Court Justices,
41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1551, 1551 (Oct. 17, 2005) (“Harriet Miers is a uniquely
qualified person to serve on the bench. She is a smart – she is capable. She is a pioneer.
She’s been consistently ranked as one of the top 50 women lawyers in the United States.
She has been a leader in the legal profession.”); Remarks Announcing the Nomination of
John G. Roberts, Jr., To Be Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, 41 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1354, 1354 (Sept. 5, 2005) (“I chose Judge Roberts from among the most
distinguished jurists and attorneys in the country because he possesses the intellect,
experience, and temperament to be an outstanding member of our Nation’s highest
court. . . . John Roberts has built a record of excellence and achievement, and a reputation
for good will and decency towards others.”); Roberts Nomination, supra note 9, at 1192
(“[A] nominee to [the Supreme Court] must be a person of superb credentials and the
highest integrity . . . .”).
34 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Judicial Selection: Ideology Versus Character, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 659, 661 (2004) (arguing that “character should be of primary importance
in the judicial selection process, and political ideology should play a relatively minor role”
(footnote omitted)).
35 See, e.g., Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy To Be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 154
(1987) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“I am
pleased to hear you say that you have no cosmology of constitutional theory, no overarching principles, and I think that is a very important basic concept. When you take up the
ideologies of original intent or you take up the ideologies of interpretivism and neutral
principles, there is a tendency, as I see it, for the Supreme Court, for the federal courts or
any courts to become musclebound and unduly restrictive.”).
33
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questions about the nominees’ judicial philosophies. 36 Consequently, the
Roberts and Alito hearings could be construed as extending, rather than
deviating from, the Senate’s practice of taking a nominee’s judicial philosophy
into account in deploying its Advice and Consent authority.
Fifth, recent experience demonstrates that presidents, senators, and
nominees all play important roles in protecting and defining the limits of
judicial confirmation proceedings. Senators from both parties agree that the
Constitution and judicial canons impose limits on the questioning of judicial
nominees. 37 They agree that nominees may be questioned generally about
their judicial philosophies and their records, and they agree that nominees may
not be questioned about how they would rule on particular matters likely to
come before them as judges or Justices. 38 Although senators diverge over the
specificity or propriety of hypothetical questioning, they also recognize that
they each have the authority to define and enforce the limits of such
questioning. As nominees, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito recognized
that they had the discretion not to answer philosophical inquiries that trod, in
their judgments, too closely upon their judicial independence. 39 President
Bush and his staff conducted elaborate screening mechanisms for sifting
through prospective nominations. Throughout the Alito, Miers, and Roberts
nomination proceedings, President Bush, senators, and the nominees all took
responsibility for defining and avoiding any threat to their personal or
collective judicial independence.
36 See, e.g., Roberts Hearing, supra note 13, at 34 (statement of Sen. Russell D.
Feingold, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (informing John Roberts that he planned to
“ask questions about topics such as executive power, civil liberties, voting rights, the death
penalty, and other important issues”); id. at 39 (statement of Sen. Charles E. Schumer,
Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“[I]t is our obligation to ask and your obligation to
answer questions about your judicial philosophy and legal ideology. . . . You should be
prepared to explain your views of the First Amendment and civil rights and environmental
rights, religious liberty, privacy, workers’ rights, women’s rights, and a host of other issues
relevant to the most powerful lifetime post in the Nation.”).
37 See, e.g., id. at 8-9 (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Member, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary) (explaining that nominees cannot answer “questions that seek hints, forecasts or
previews about how they would rule on particular issues,” or “questions asking them to
opine or speculate about hypotheticals outside of an actual case”); id. at 39 (statement of
Sen. Charles E. Schumer, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (admitting the need to avoid
asking questions that would require a nominee to “indicate[] prejudgment about a future
case”).
38 See supra notes 36-37.
39 See, e.g., Alito Hearing, supra note 20, at 514 (statement of Samuel A. Alito, Jr.)
(warning that it “would undermine the entire judicial decisionmaking process” if judges
indicated in advance how they might rule on cases); Roberts Hearing, supra note 13, at 147
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.) (refusing to answer a question, explaining “I think that
gets to the application of the principles in a particular case, and based on my review of the
prior transcripts of every nominee sitting on the Court today, that’s where they’ve generally
declined to answer”).
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Sixth, both the President and the Senate appear keenly interested in finding
Justices who will be able to resist what they consider to be the “wrong”
influences or impulses. The independence that counts, for them, appears to be
an imperviousness to what I will call “constitutional laxity,” by which I mean a
willingness to construe the Constitution in ways that President Bush and most
senators would not. Judicial independence, for the President and the current
Republican majority, apparently means standing up to Congress when it has
exceeded its Commerce Clause powers or its powers under section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment. It means resisting the advocacy of liberals who want
to stretch constitutional protections for such issues as affirmative action and
homosexual sodomy, and it means ignoring the pleas of other Justices who
stray from rigid adherence to the original understanding of the Constitution.
Judicial independence thus ultimately requires imperviousness to the liberal
influences that apparently corrupted Justices O’Connor, Souter, and Kennedy.
In other words, for conservatives, judicial independence means “holding the
fort,” and “staying the course,” regardless of public opinion and changing
fashions.
Faith also appears pertinent insofar as all three of President Bush’s
nominees have had strong religious faith. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito have become the Court’s fourth and fifth Roman Catholics, underscoring
the apparent connection between religious faith and judicial performance. 40
Even more important than nominees’ religious convictions may be their
experience: all three of Bush’s nominees had significant professional
experience in the executive branch. This follows a pattern, as seven of the last
nine Republican nominees to the Court have had such experience. It is no
coincidence that these Republican nominees had such experience in common,
for it has clearly produced nominees (1) who tend to be sympathetic to
executive branch arguments before the Court; and (2) whose beliefs on
constitutional issues are well-known to the people responsible for judicial
selection in the White House and Justice Department.
Last but not least, the real test of the “new” rhetoric has yet to take place. It
will come when we re-enter a period of divided government, at which time
senators from the opposition party will be pressed to take nominees’ judicial
ideologies into account. Some Republican senators have argued that their
Democratic colleagues ought to follow the precedent that conservatives set
when they supported the nominations of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen
Breyer, in spite of their liberal inclinations. 41 President Clinton did not,

40 Cf. Margaret Ramirez & Manya A. Brachear, With Alito, Catholics Would Be Court
Majority: His Confirmation Would Mark a Milestone, but Experts Debate What the Impact
Would Be, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 13, 2006, at C12.
41 See, e.g., Roberts Hearing, supra note 13, at 37 (statement of Sen. Lindsey O.
Graham, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“Justice Ginsburg got 96 votes, even though
she expressed a view of the Federal Government’s role in abortion that I completely
disagree with, and I think most conservatives disagree with.”); id. at 15 (statement of Sen.
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however, nominate Justices Breyer and Ginsburg without first clearing their
nominations with the Republican leadership. 42 When nominated, Ginsburg
and Breyer already had the support of most senators on the record. President
Bush, too, nominated Roberts and Alito only after seeking the opinions of
more than half of the Senate about their and other possible nominees’
prospects. Thus, the success of future Supreme Court nominees apparently
depends on assessing senators’ likely reactions before making nominations.
II.

THE LIMITS ON THE POWER TO REGULATE FEDERAL JURISDICTION

This part examines various proposals introduced in, or considered by, the
House of Representatives to restrict federal jurisdiction over particular
constitutional claims. I examine both the most credible constitutional
foundations for the proposals and the external constitutional constraints
prohibiting their enactment.
A.

The New Rhetoric (and More) in the House

In the past several years, some members of the House have proposed
measures for keeping the federal judiciary in check. In several instances, the
House Judiciary Committee has become the principal forum for expressing
frustration with the Rehnquist Court and the federal judiciary generally, with
particular emphasis on certain lower courts. The thrust of these proposals has
been to correct or to minimize the damage done by what some have considered
to be “unprincipled” judicial decisions.
The proposed legislation has taken at least four forms. First, some proposals
would strip lower courts from hearing, or the Supreme Court from hearing on
appeal, any claim relating to gay marriage. 43 Second, some proposed
legislation would strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over any cases
involving challenges to public acknowledgments of G-d as a source of
American law. 44 The third type of legislation consists of proposals that, if
enacted, would strip all federal courts of the jurisdiction to entertain any
challenges to the Pledge of Allegiance. 45 Fourth, the House Judiciary
Committee has considered a prohibition on the reliance on foreign law by any

Charles E. Grassley, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“I am hopeful that we will see a
dignified confirmation process that will not degenerate into what we saw during the Bork
and Thomas hearings. Rather, we need to see the same level of civility as we saw during the
O’Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer hearings.”).
42 See GEYH, supra note 29, at 205.
43 See Marriage Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 1100, 109th Cong. (2005); Marriage
Protection Act of 2004, H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. (2004).
44 See Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 1070, 109th Cong. § 101 (2005);
Constitution Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 3799, 108th Cong. § 101 (2004).
45 See Pledge Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 2389, 109th Cong. (2005); Pledge Protection
Act of 2004, H.R. 2028, 108th Cong. (2004).
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Article III judge or Justice in interpreting the U.S. Constitution, and a
declaration that any such reliance is an impeachable offense. 46
These proposed bills have several things in common. First, none has passed.
Indeed, some critics might dismiss the proposed legislation as relatively
transparent, cynical appeals to particular constituencies. More importantly, the
failure of these measures may reflect the ongoing acceptance within the House
of a constitutional norm against legislation that would directly interfere with
judicial decisions or decision making.
Second, all of the proposed bills were responses to particular judicial
decisions. For example, the proposal to strip federal jurisdiction over any
claim relating to gay marriage derived from concerns that Article III judges
would render rulings similar to that of Massachusetts’ highest court, which
ruled in 2003 that the state constitution did not allow the state to bar same-sex
marriages. 47 Moreover, the proposed measure barring reliance on foreign law
was a reaction to two decisions in which a majority of the Rehnquist Court
cited foreign law in passing as a basis for declaring a state law
unconstitutional. 48 (This same measure may also show how Justices are able
to influence the political process; Justice Scalia may have fanned the flames of
outrage over these two decisions with his biting dissents in both cases, along
with his open denunciation of the two decisions in public speeches.) 49
Third, all of the proposed measures seek to vindicate particular conceptions
of judging. It is possible to construe these measures as efforts to hold up
Justices Scalia and Thomas as models of proper judging, for opinions by one
or both of them grounded the legislators’ disagreements with particular
decisions. Moreover, the proposed measures have had the arguably salutary
effect of putting pressure on other House members to commit to a position and
either openly agree or disagree with the criticism of the Court, and on the
President to appoint Justices, as he had hinted, in the mold of either Justice
Scalia or Thomas. 50
46

See H.R. 1070 §§ 201, 302; H.R. 3799 §§ 201, 302.
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
48 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 577-78 (2005) (acknowledging “the overwhelming
weight of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 576 (2003) (recognizing that “[o]ther nations . . . have taken action consistent with
an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual
conduct”).
49 Roper, 543 U.S. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (attacking the Court’s citation of foreign
law as an approach that “ought to be rejected out of hand”); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s discussion of foreign views as “[d]angerous
dicta”); Justice Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address at the American Enterprise Institute
Conference: Outsourcing of American Law (Feb. 21, 2006), available at
http://www.aei.org/events/filter.all,eventID.1256/transcript.asp (insisting that “foreign legal
materials can never be relevant to an interpretation of . . . the United States Constitution”).
50 See Harriet Chiang, Election Could Shape Supreme Court for Years To Come, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 24, 2000, at A4 (“Bush said in his first debate with Gore that he would appoint
47
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Fourth, none of the proposed measures is believed, at least by its sponsors,
to violate the constitutional principle of judicial independence. To the
contrary, the measures are considered consistent with a construction of Article
III that vests in Congress the plenary power to restrict the federal courts from
considering any subject matter that Congress prefers for them not to hear. This
construction requires reading the Constitution as providing no internal or
external restraints on Congress’ power to regulate federal jurisdiction. 51
Such nearly limitless regulation of federal jurisdiction may be understood as
not interfering with legitimate, or lawful, judging. It may be understood
instead as limiting unlawful or illegitimate judging (as understood by the
sponsors of the proposed legislation). Thus, these proposed measures appear
consistent with a quasi-procedural conception of judicial independence. I
understand this conception as recognizing constitutional authorization of the
Congress to restrict federal judges from committing certain abuses of their
authority and to channel, or steer, them into what is considered “proper”
judicial decision making. In short, these measures are attempts by Congress to
keep judges in line.
B.

The External Limits on Regulating Federal Jurisdiction

The recent proposals to strip the federal courts of the jurisdiction to hear
constitutional claims regarding gay marriage, the Pledge of Allegiance, public
acknowledgments of G-d, and the flag share the same problem – they all fail to
comply with the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. While legal scholars
have long been divided over the extent to which there are limits on Congress’
power to regulate federal jurisdiction, 52 those differences need not be settled in
order to resolve the constitutionality of the recent proposals. As I discuss
below, the fact that Congress may have plenary power to regulate the
jurisdiction of the federal courts does not mean that the power is unbounded.
The power to regulate federal jurisdiction is subject, like every plenary
congressional power, to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
‘strict constructionists,’ which may not mean much to the ordinary voter. More telling,
perhaps, is his comment that the justices he most admires are Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas, who make up the right wing of the court.”).
51 See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. H7445, 7451 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner) (reiterating Justice William Brennan’s statement that “‘virtually all matters
that might be heard in Article III Federal courts could also be left by Congress to the State
courts’”); 150 CONG. REC. H6559, 6568 (daily ed. July 22, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Hostettler) (“Congress has the authority to make exceptions and regulations with regard to
all of the appellate cases that come before the Supreme Court. Anyone that actually reads
the Constitution and has a basic understanding of grammar and the English language in
general can find that in fact the Constitution grants Congress the authority.”).
52 See Ralph A. Rossum, Congress, the Constitution, and the Appellate Jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court: The Letter and the Spirit of the Exceptions Clause, 24 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 385, 386 & nn.5-11 (1983) (citing scholarly literature debating “whether and to what
extent Congress can or should strip the Court of appellate subject matter jurisdiction”).
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First, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause requires that there at least
be a rational basis for each law enacted by Congress. The efforts to restrict
federal jurisdiction over constitutional claims such as gay marriage or the
Pledge of Allegiance, however, lack a rational basis. The restrictions are not
based on plans to preserve the federal courts’ scarce resources. Nor are they
based on the superior expertise of state judges in dealing with federal
constitutional claims relating to such matters as gay marriage, the flag, or the
Pledge of Allegiance. To the contrary, the restrictions are solely based on
hostility to, or distrust of, Article III courts. 53 It is not hard to figure that
hostility to, or distrust of, Article III courts fails the traditional rational basis
test. The Supreme Court, or any other Article III court, likely would not
hesitate to find that proposed bills stripping federal courts of certain
constitutional claims lacked a rational basis. Indeed, this would be similar to
the ground on which the Court struck down a state law in Romer v. Evans:
because it was based on animus, not on plausible justification. 54
Second, the proposed restrictions are designed to enable state courts to
evade certain judicial rulings, and thus weaken them. The provisions would
make the state courts the courts of last resort on certain constitutional questions
that either the Supreme Court or some other federal court has already
addressed. The state courts would thus have the last word on the Constitution
in cases involving these interests.
The Supreme Court has more than once struck down regulations of
jurisdiction that are designed to directly undermine, or weaken, its prior
constitutional rulings. 55 In United States v. Morrison, 56 the Court made clear
that it, not Congress, was the final arbiter in determining the scope of
congressional powers. 57 Congress may not undermine a ruling by redirecting
an issue into the state courts whenever it disagrees with the Court’s resolution
of the issue. Put another way, the proposals to strip the federal courts of all
jurisdiction over certain previously adjudicated constitutional claims in the
53

See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. H7445, 7451 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner) (“A remedy to abuses by Federal judges has long been understood to lie,
among other places, in Congress’s authority to limit Federal court jurisdiction.”); 150 CONG.
REC. H6559, 6563 (daily ed. July 22, 2004) (statement by Rep. Duncan) (arguing that the
Marriage Protection Act of 2004 should be allowed to limit federal jurisdiction “because it
is true that many, many people in this country have been upset that unelected judges have
assumed so much super-legislative power in this country in recent years”).
54 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (“[L]aws of the kind now before us raise
the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class
of persons affected.”).
55 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000) (holding that Congress
could not legislatively supersede the constitutional rule announced in Miranda); Ex Parte
Klein, 80 U.S. 129, 147-48 (1871) (striking down a law that attempted to overturn the
Court’s earlier ruling on the scope of the President’s pardon powers).
56 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
57 Id. at 614.
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Supreme Court (or other Article III courts) would allow state courts to
completely circumvent, narrow, and effectively overrule what the Court has
already said about these or similar claims.
The most powerful defense of the proposed court-stripping measures is that
they may not effectuate an actual deprivation of due process. In San Antonio v.
Rodriguez, 58 the Court rejected a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to Texas’
funding scheme for public schools, based in part on its determination that the
scheme did not actually “deprive” any students of a public education.59
Students could continue to attend public schools, just as they had prior to the
enactment of the funding scheme. Similarly, the proposed restrictions on
federal courts’ power to hear certain constitutional claims arguably do not
deprive those claims of a hearing consistent with due process. As long as state
courts accorded those claims the same treatment they gave to other federal
claims, it would be hard to argue that the deprivation of a federal forum for
adjudicating the claims amounted to a deprivation of due process.
The main problem with this argument is that the denial of a federal forum
for particular claims is plainly designed to effectuate a deprivation. The whole
point of the legislation is to deprive certain claimants of access to a federal
forum. While it is true that claimants redirected into state courts by the
proposed federal measures would still have access to a judicial forum, they
would be denied at least two essential features of the federal court system –
finality and uniformity. 60 The proposed measures would effectively make
state courts the courts of last resort for particular federal claims.
Consequently, these claims could be adjudicated differently in different states,
thereby leaving the federal interest potentially subject to fifty different state
court interpretations, and inconsistent or conflicting outcomes across the
country.
An analogy may help to illuminate the potential problems with the proposed
court-stripping measures. A state has no affirmative constitutional duty to
create or fund public swimming pools. 61 Nonetheless, a state needs to have at
least a rational basis for closing a public pool or other public service.
Although it is easy to imagine that a rational basis exists for not offering the
service in the first place, it would be harder to devise a rational basis for
58

411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Id. at 25.
60 See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 348 (1816) (stressing the need for a
“revising authority to control [different state courts’] jarring and discordant judgments, and
harmonize them into uniformity”).
61 Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 220 (1971) (“[N]either the Fourteenth
Amendment nor any Act of Congress purports to impose an affirmative duty on a State to
begin to operate or to continue to operate swimming pools.”). Likewise, a state has no
affirmative duty to protect a child from the child’s own guardian. DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (“[N]othing in the language of the
Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its
citizens against invasion by private actors.”).
59
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completely shutting down an already established service. This is especially
true where the service has been closed in direct response to a judicial decision
with which the state authorities do not wish to comply.
Thus, regardless of whether the withdrawal of jurisdiction leaves the
claimants with a remedy in state court, it does not leave them whole. Prior to
the withdrawal of federal jurisdiction, their claims would have had the benefit
of potentially receiving uniform, final adjudication in Article III courts, but
after the withdrawal, the claims have no chance of receiving any such
treatment. Clearly, something is being deprived as a result of the withdrawal –
namely, the opportunity for Article III courts to adjudicate the claims. There
must have been something special about this opportunity or some special
problem with Article III courts hearing these claims, or they would not need to
be restricted from them. The problem for the proponents of the restriction is
the impossibility of demonstrating a rational basis for depriving every Article
III court of the power to hear the claims. Some, maybe even most, might get it
right.
The Constitution Restoration Act has even more significant ramifications.
Not only does the Act fail to comply with the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, it also violates judicial independence. In particular, its ban of judicial
reliance on foreign law violates the independence of Article III judges to
decide which sources to consult in constitutional adjudication. Justice Scalia
made this point in a speech that was reported on in the Washington Post:
“It’s none of your business,” he said, referring to Congress. “No one
is more opposed to the use of foreign law than I am, but I’m darned if I
think it’s up to Congress to direct the [C]ourt how to make its decisions.”
The proposed legislation “is like telling us not to use certain
principles of logic,” he said, adding: “Let us make our mistakes just as we
let you make yours.” 62
Even Justice Scalia agrees that Congress has no constitutional authority to
direct how the Court decides constitutional cases. The Constitution guarantees
judges and Justices the discretion to choose an approach to deciding
constitutional cases. The Constitution provides checks and balances for the
other branches to correct the Court’s mistakes, but, as the next part shows,
impeachment and removal are not among them.
III. THE STRICT LIABILITY THEORY OF IMPEACHMENT
In this part, I discuss the proposal, made by some House members and a few
constitutional scholars, to allow removal of federal judges for bad decisions.
After describing the proposal and its supposed support, I examine the opposing
textual, structural, and historical arguments. I explain why the latter arguments

62 Charles Lane, Scalia Tells Congress To Mind Its Own Business, WASH. POST, May 19,
2006, at A19.
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are compelling and why they have prevailed time and again in barring
implementation of the strict liability theory of impeachment.
A.

The Strict Liability Theory of Impeachment

As previously noted, the Constitution Restoration Act provides, inter alia,
that judicial reliance on foreign law in constitutional adjudication ought to be
treated as an impeachable offense. 63 Members of Congress who support this
provision presumably believe that the Constitution both empowers Congress to
make this declaration and to use it to impeach and remove federal judges who
rely on foreign law. Apparently, some contemporary congressional leaders, as
well as some scholars, believe that federal judges may be impeached and
removed for employing the wrong techniques in constitutional adjudication.
For instance, House Majority Leader Tom DeLay “repeatedly threatened to
impeach liberal-leaning judges for their rulings,” 64 and James Sensenbrenner,
the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, proposed legislation
establishing an inspector general to investigate federal judges. 65
DeLay was notorious as one of the leaders in the House pushing to impeach
President Bill Clinton for perjury and obstruction of justice. 66 A central claim
he levied against Clinton was that he had violated the rule of law. Indeed, the
mantra throughout President Clinton’s impeachment proceedings was that his
removal was required in order to protect the rule of law. 67 He had sworn an
oath to tell the truth in both a deposition and grand jury testimony; his failure
to do so constituted perjury. The context of the perjury – the fact that it
occurred during a line of questioning about possible extramarital sexual
misconduct – was irrelevant to proponents of Clinton’s ouster. His frame of
mind was also irrelevant. What mattered was that Clinton had crossed a line,
and that breach was sufficient to justify the imposition of impeachment’s
unique sanctions – removal and disqualification. I describe this understanding
of the grounds for impeachment as the “strict liability theory of impeachment,”
because it requires both removal and disqualification for a bad act. Doing the

63

Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 1070, 109th Cong. § 302 (2005).
David G. Savage, Rehnquist Sees Threat to Judiciary, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2005, at A1.
65 Editorial, Judges Should Police Themselves, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2006, at A28.
66 See Bennett Roth, DeLay Carrying Flag in GOP’s Impeachment Charge, HOUSTON
CHRON., Dec. 13, 1998, at A1 (“[M]any credit DeLay, the House majority whip, for
reversing the momentum against impeachment.”).
67 See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. S1743, 1790 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1999) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) (“President Clinton did more than just break the law. He broke his oath of office and
broke faith with the American people. . . . I will vote for conviction on both articles of
impeachment – not because I want to – but because I must. Upholding our Constitution . . .
is more important than any one person, including the President of the United States.”); 144
CONG. REC. H9593, 9596 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1998) (statement of Rep. Barr) (“If we accept
that this inquiry is merely about sex and politics, we have already failed in our constitutional
responsibility. This is about the rule of law. It is about accountability.”).
64
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bad act, and nothing more, is all that is required, in this view, for removal and
disqualification. In this view of impeachment, mens rea – or a malicious or
bad intent – is not required for conviction in a Senate impeachment trial.
The belief that federal judges may be removed for bad decisions is an old
one. It has had adherents throughout American history, and its proponents
have claimed both textual and historical support. The textual argument is that
the presence of the phrase “during good behavior” 68 in the clause granting
tenure to Article III judges implies that judges can be removed for bad
behavior. 69 This text could be read as establishing a different, lower standard
of removal for federal judges than it does for the President and other highranking officials, who only may be removed for “Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” 70 On this reading of the Constitution,
Article III judges may be impeached, but they may also be removed by means
other than impeachment for misbehavior. Proponents of this lower standard
maintain that it is supported by some statements made by both the Framers and
the Ratifiers, and particularly by pre-ratification practices in some states and
by Congress’ early, post-ratification practices. 71
The “strict liability theory of impeachment” has been advocated by some
conservative scholars in recent years. First, Steven Fitschen has argued both in
print and before the Federalist Society that the House has in fact previously
introduced impeachment resolutions against some federal judges based on their
bad decisions. 72 Second, there is a recent article in the Yale Law Journal, by
Saikrishna Prakash and Steve Smith, which argues that a bad act by a judge,
including a bad decision, demonstrates a bad or dangerous tendency that may
by itself serve as the basis for removing that judge from the bench. 73
The claim that a bad act, or a bad tendency, is sufficient for removal can be
traced back to colonial America, and it can be heard at the constitutional and
ratification conventions. 74 It surfaced again in a few early federal and state
impeachments. 75 It was a position held by a minority at the time of the
drafting and ratification of the Constitution. In almost every instance, the bad

68

See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (declaring that judges “shall hold their offices during good
Behaviour”).
69 See RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 131-32 (1973)
(“When the Constitution limited judicial tenure to ‘during good behavior,’ the Framers selfevidently did not intend that a judge who behaved badly and thus violated the condition of
his tenure should be continued in office.”).
70 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
71 See generally Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How To Remove a Federal
Judge, 116 YALE L.J. 72 (2006).
72 Steven W. Fitschen, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Covenantal and Constitutional
Response to Judicial Tyranny, 10 REGENT U. L. REV. 111, 138 (1998).
73 Prakash & Smith, supra note 71, at 78 & n.15.
74 See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 1, at 101.
75 See id. at 182-83, 186-87, 199, 228-40.
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tendency standard, or what I call the “strict liability theory of impeachment,”
was a minority viewpoint. Historical comments favoring the strict liability
theory of impeachment were only a part of an ongoing dialogue among the
Framers, early state legislators, and the members of the first few Congresses.
The other side of the conversation, which almost always prevailed, rejected the
strict liability theory of impeachment.
B.

Why the Strict Liability Theory of Impeachment Is, and Always Has Been,
Wrong

There are good reasons why the strict liability theory of impeachment, so
popular among many proponents of President Clinton’s ouster and more
recently among some conservatives, has never been recognized, much less
applied, as a correct understanding of the constitutional law of impeachment.
The theory was rejected in colonial America prior to ratification, it was
rejected during the constitutional and ratification conventions, 76 and it has
been rejected in post-ratification state and federal impeachment practices. 77
The consistently prevailing view among the Framers and the Ratifiers, as well
as among our leaders and scholars, has been that impeachment and removal of
federal judges require both a bad act and a malicious intent.
For a demonstration of what the Constitution requires for removal of federal
judges, let’s return to the constitutional text. As we have seen, proponents of
the strict liability theory of impeachment interpret the phrase “during good
behavior” quite literally. It plainly means, they argue, what it says – that
judges can be removed for any bad behavior or misbehavior. This reading is
not silly, but it is not persuasive for the simple reason that it depends on
reading the portion of Article III that defines judicial tenure as bearing no
relationship whatsoever to any other part of the Constitution. Akhil Amar
describes this kind of constitutional construction as “blinkered textualism,” 78
because it fails to recognize that the meanings of particular words or phrases in
the Constitution depend upon their context and their relationship to other parts
of the text. There is an entirely different way to read the language defining
judicial tenure in Article III: that it distinguishes such tenure from that of
elected officials. Every official, except Article III judges, serves for a limited
term. The phrase “during good behavior” may imply that Article III judges
can be removed for misbehavior, but it does not mean that they can be
removed for any kind of misbehavior. Article III judges are mentioned, like
the President, as being subject to impeachment and removal for certain kinds
of misconduct – namely, “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.” Thus, if we put the pertinent portions of Articles II and III
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See id. at 64, 97, 101-02, 254-55.
See id. at 142-45, 182-83.
Amar, supra note 7, at 303.
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together, they may be read as allowing federal judges to serve for life subject
to impeachment and removal only for certain kinds of misconduct. 79
The strict liability theory of impeachment is even harder to square with the
structure of the Constitution. If the language “during good behavior” sets a
lower standard for removal of federal judges, then it is reasonable to ask:
removal by whom? The text is silent on this question. Since removal of
judges is a serious business, this would seem to be an enormous oversight.
Moreover, if the Constitution sets a lower standard for the removal of federal
judges than for presidents or other officials, then why should members of
Congress bother to subject judges to the federal impeachment process? In the
federal impeachment process, there are highly restrictive grounds for removal.
Removal may only be achieved when the tough standards of impeachment are
met by a majority vote of the House, and at least a two-thirds vote of the
Senate for conviction and removal. It would be an enormous waste of time to
discipline judges through the cumbersome impeachment process set forth in
the Federal Constitution rather than through some less exacting method. One
basic canon of constitutional construction is to make sense of the structure, and
subjecting Article III judges to the lower standard of removal for bad behavior
produces a nonsensical structure.
Though proponents of the strict liability theory of impeachment rely on
some historical materials, the original understanding of the federal
impeachment process and historical practices prior to ratification show that the
Framers’ roundly rejected the strict liability theory of impeachment. In fact,
the constitutional and ratification conventions reflect a shared intent to narrow
the grounds for judicial removal, particularly to protect the judiciary from
popular control or retaliation. On the one occasion that the “good behavior”
clause was directly challenged, the challenge failed. 80 On August 27, 1787,
John Dickinson moved that the good behavior clause be followed by an
additional provision that judges “‘may be removed by the Executive on the
application [of] the Senate and House of Representatives.’” 81 This was similar
to impeachment provisions found in some early state constitutions. 82 The
79

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 79, at 505-06 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed.,
2000); see also MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS 84 (2d ed.
2000).
80
Charles Gardner Geyh & Emily Field Van Tassel, The Independence of the Judicial
Branch in the New Republic, 74 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 31, 41 (1998).
81 Id. (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 428 (Max
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) (recorded by James Madison)).
82 See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 23 (“The President . . . and all others, offending
against the state either by mal-administration, corruption or other means, by which the
safety of the commonwealth may be endangered . . . shall be impeachable by the House of
Assembly before the Legislative Council . . . .”); MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. II, ch. 1, § 2,
art. VIII (“The Senate shall be a court with full authority to hear and determine all
impeachments made by the House of Representatives, against any officer or officers of the
Commonwealth, for misconduct and maladministration in their offices . . . .”); MASS.
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motion was met with overwhelming opposition. Gouverneur Morris argued
that it was “‘a contradiction in terms to say that the Judges should hold their
offices during good behavior, and yet be removable without a trial,’” leading
him to conclude that it would be “‘fundamentally wrong to subject Judges to so
arbitrary an authority.’” 83 James Wilson agreed: “‘Judges would be in a bad
situation if made to depend on every gust of faction which might prevail in the
two branches of our [government].’” 84 Edmund Randolph likewise objected
that the amendment would “‘weaken[] too much the independence of the
Judges.’” 85 The delegates rejected the motion by a vote of seven delegations
to one. 86
Prior to ratification, some states defined judicial tenure as “during good
behavior,” and some officially allowed impeachment for misbehavior. 87 The
Federal Constitution, however, combined “during good behavior” with
language in Article II that narrowed the scope of impeachable offenses to
“Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” The only state
that followed the federal model was Pennsylvania, 88 where, as we will see, the
state assembly tried but failed to implement the strict liability theory of
impeachment.
The Framers drew heavily on their experience with impeachment in the
states, which was influenced in turn by British and particularly colonial
practices. 89 One common theme in this period was the recognition of a
common law of impeachment requiring both a bad act and a malicious intent
for removal. 90 During this period, people recognized that one of the obstacles
to the easy removal of a public official was proving that the official had acted
with malicious intent. The desire to make removal easier became stronger with
the rise of the two-party system. The Constitution made no allowance for
CONST. of 1780, pt. II, ch. 1, § 3, art. VI (“The House of Representatives shall be the Grand
Inquest of this Commonwealth; and all impeachments made by them, shall be heard and
tried by the Senate.”).
83 Geyh & Van Tassel, supra note 80, at 41 (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 81, at 428 (recorded by James Madison)).
84 Id. (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 81, at
429 (recorded by James Madison)).
85 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, supra note 81, at 429 (recorded by James Madison)).
86 Id.
87 See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 23; VA. CONST. of 1776, ch. II, arts. XIV-XVII.
88 See PA. CONST. of 1776, § 22.
89 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 503 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed.,
2000); THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, at 418-19 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed.,
2000); see also BERGER, supra note 69, at 54 (explaining the importance of British law in
drafting the impeachment provisions).
90 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 500 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed.,
2000); Michael J. Gerhardt, Chancellor Kent and the Search for the Elements of
Impeachable Offenses, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 91, 122-23 (1998).
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removals driven by partisanship, however, because the Framers had designed
the impeachment process without the possibility of a two-party system of
government in mind. 91 They had no experience with what we call “partymotivated behavior.” They did not expect that the impeachment process might
be used in an attempt to consolidate a party’s power. Partisans seeking to
remove officials who did not share their beliefs had to find ways to remove
those officials with the mechanisms set forth in the newly ratified Federal
Constitution.
The original understanding of the Constitution is squarely at odds with
allowing removal for a federal judge’s bad decisions. As Professors Hoffer
and Hull wrote:
No framer wished to bring the English ‘bad advice’ doctrine to
American shores. As James Iredell told the North Carolina delegates:
“God forbid that a man, in any country in the world, should be liable to be
punished for want of judgment. This is not the case here. . . . Whatever
mistake a man may make, he ought not to be punished for it, nor his
posterity rendered infamous. But if a man be a villain, and wilfully abuse
his trust, he is to be held up as a public offender, and ignominiously
punished . . . nothing but real guilt can disgrace him.” 92
Federalists and anti-Federalists alike shared Iredell’s view that judges were not
to be “punished for want of judgment.” “Brutus,” a well-known anti-Federalist
who feared that judges would exercise judicial review with too little caution,
understood that judges who did so could not be impeached. He admitted that
judges were “‘removable only for crimes,’” and that “‘errors in judgment’”
were not crimes in the absence of “‘wicked and corrupt motives.’” 93
Hamilton, in The Federalist, dismissed Brutus’ fears as overblown but
concurred in the view that judges could only be impeached after a “‘series of
deliberate usurpations.’” 94 Thus both the Federalist and anti-Federalist papers
“reinforce the view, apparently shared at the Convention, that impeachment
and removal were available to remedy crimes politically defined” – such as
judicial abuse of power – “but would not reach errors in judgment in isolated
cases.” 95
In the pre-ratification period, no state judges were impeached or removed
for erroneous decisions.
As Professors Hoffer and Hull found,
91

See GEYH, supra note 29, at 184-86.
HOFFER & HULL, supra note 1, at 118 (alterations in original) (quoting 4 JONATHAN
ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 126 (2d ed. 1859)).
93 Geyh & Van Tassel, supra note 80, at 49 (quoting Brutus, The Power of the Judiciary
(Part I), The New-York Journal (Mar. 20, 1788), reprinted in THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS
222, 224 (Morton Borden ed., 1965)).
94 Id. at 50 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 518 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert
Scigliano ed., 2000)).
95 Id.
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“[i]ncompetence, inattention to duty, and excess partisanship in office were
also grounds for impeachment when they endangered the state, but no one was
impeached without evidence of intentional neglect or total incapacity to
perform official duties.” 96
There were, however, unsuccessful attempts to impeach judges based on
their decisions. As Professors Hoffer and Hull write, “[t]he outstanding
example of an impeachment intended to curb a branch of government in the
period 1776-88 occurred in North Carolina.” 97 Led by Chief Justice Samuel
Ashe, the superior court judges of the state, most of whom were antiFederalists, joined the state legislature in weakening the claims of exLoyalists. 98 Some conservative legislators, who supported the ex-Loyalists,
drafted impeachment articles charging judges with such misconduct as refusing
to hear suits brought by certain ex-Loyalists, directing a grand jury to bring
misdemeanor indictments against certain ex-Loyalists, and missing some court
sessions. 99 (This latter misconduct was allegedly committed by Ashe.) 100 The
judges defended themselves on the quite reasonable ground that the assembly
had asked them to dismiss claims and they had simply followed those
instructions. 101 The legislature exonerated all of the judges but Ashe, who
remained the main target of the conservative legislators. 102 When Ashe
refused to come to the assembly to answer further charges of malfeasance, he
was harshly condemned. 103 When he finally did appear, he was furious in
responding to the charges. 104 He nevertheless remained on the bench and all
efforts to punish him failed.
Those arguing for a lower standard of removal for judges rely on two
precedents in particular. The first involves a district judge, John Pickering,
whom the House impeached and the Senate removed essentially for his
The difficulty with following the Pickering
dangerous tendencies. 105
precedent is that it appears his fundamental problem was that he was insane,
not that he was making bad decisions. The members of Congress voting to
impeach and remove him from office were aware of his insanity, and the focus
of the debate in his impeachment proceedings was on the question of whether
mental instability could properly qualify as a “high crime or misdemeanor.” 106
96

HOFFER & HULL, supra note 1, at 85.
Id. at 87.
98 Id. at 88.
99 Id. at 89.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 90.
102 Id. at 91.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 EMILY FIELD VAN TASSEL & PAUL FINKELMAN, IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY FROM 1787 TO THE PRESENT, at 92 (1999).
106 Id.
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While the House and the Senate each resolved this question in the affirmative,
people at the time seem to have understood the Pickering impeachment as
having demonstrated that the federal impeachment process could be employed
to remove someone who was insane, and not necessarily as having
demonstrated anything more.
The second precedent often cited by proponents of the strict liability theory
of impeachment is the removal of Alexander Addison, president of the Fifth
District Court of Pennsylvania. 107 Addison was a heavy-handed Federalist
who strictly enforced the Alien and Sedition laws. 108 In 1800, Addison barred
Republican judge John Lucas from participating in or contributing to the
instructions or rulings of the court. 109 Both chambers of the Pennsylvania
legislature lobbied for the option of impeachment, which had proven
successful previously in Pennsylvania and in other states. 110 Without any
evidence of directly unconstitutional behavior on Addison’s part, the
prosecutors in the impeachment trial reframed their accusations against him to
instead claim that he had “acted in a way that undermined the constitution –
that is to say, the consequences of his acts were the real misdemeanor.” 111
Addison tried to defend himself by arguing that he lacked any malicious intent,
but he was convicted by the state senate by a vote of 20-4. 112 The penalty was
disqualification from holding judicial office.
The legal significance of Addison’s conviction remains unclear. On the
surface, it appears that his conviction did sanction impeachment on the basis of
dangerous tendency. But Addison’s disqualification could just as easily be
explained as having helped to secure the independence of Judge Lucas. After
all, Addison had tried to bar Lucas from performing his judicial duties, and
disqualifying Addison sent a strong signal that such interference was
completely inappropriate.
However one may construe the Addison precedent, subsequent historical
practices support the requirement of both a bad act and malicious intent for
judicial removal. 113 Pennsylvania’s constitution did not precisely follow the
federal example on impeachment. It empowered the Pennsylvania Senate to
disqualify and remove a judge upon a vote of two-thirds of the senators. 114
The constitution defined impeachable offenses as “any misdemeanor in
office,” language that was “considerably less specific and broader . . . than that
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of the federal rule.” 115 By contrast, most other state precedents were more
specific:
[T]he first state impeachments after ratification of the federal Constitution
resembled the state cases of the previous decade. . . . Gross, intentional,
self-interested official misconduct, or some criminal act had to be alleged
for the impeachment to go forward . . . . 116
The Pickering precedent, like the Addison precedent, proved to have quite
limited utility. At the same time the House had been considering impeaching
Justice Samuel Chase, it was considering impeaching District Judge Richard
Peters. While the charge against Judge Peters was that he had sat with Justice
Chase on a panel where they both joined in a troublesome ruling, 117 the House
decided not to proceed with an impeachment proceeding against Judge Peters,
ultimately rejecting the petition for impeachment as ungrounded. 118
Meanwhile, a good deal of the arguments posited in Justice Chase’s
impeachment and removal trial involved the propriety of importing into the
impeachment process the dangerous tendency doctrine. 119 This doctrine
focused solely on the consequences of an action, not on whether the person
doing the action had a bad or malicious intent. Of course, proponents of
Justice Chase’s impeachment pointed to both Addison’s and Pickering’s
impeachments for support. 120 In the end, the Senate acquitted Chase, based in
part on the recognition of the impropriety of removing a judge merely for his
decisions.
In the meantime, Pennsylvania was the site of another critical test of the
“dangerous tendency” standard for removal. While this standard had prevailed
in Addison’s disqualification, the significance of his disqualification as a
precedent was an issue in both Pennsylvania and at the federal level. It was
tested by the attempted removal of three justices of Pennsylvania’s Supreme
Court for their reliance on British common law as the basis for a citation of
contempt. 121 In 1803 and 1804, Pennsylvania law did not forbid state judges
from relying on British common law. The three Pennsylvania Supreme Court
justices had held a man in contempt of court based on his criticism of an earlier
decision, in which they had upheld a lower court’s ruling against him in a civil
matter. The justices claimed that the common law allowed them to issue such
a citation, even in an instance where there was no case pending before their
court. All three justices were Federalists. The state senate voted 13-11 to
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convict the judges, 122 falling short of the requisite two-thirds for conviction
and removal. 123 In acquitting the justices, the senate rejected the position of
James Monroe, among others, who commented at the time that “‘application of
the principles of English common-law to our constitution’” was “‘good cause
for impeachment.’” 124 Monroe’s view, no doubt, was a variation on the strict
liability theory of impeachment, and it, like others, was rejected.
Some of the most eloquent defenses of judicial independence may be found
in the records of the Chase and Pennsylvania trials. In the House and
particularly the Senate, the strict liability theory of impeachment was roundly
rejected, especially on the ground that it would lead to the complete destruction
of judicial independence. 125 Similarly, in Pennsylvania, state legislators
argued that simply allowing a bad act to serve as the basis for a judge’s
removal would allow the legislature to remove any judges with whose
decisions it disagreed. 126
The trials and impeachments of James Peck and Charles Swayne followed
the Chase precedent. 127 In each, the Senate required proof of a bad act and a
bad intent for removal. 128 In each, the Senate rejected the strict liability theory
of impeachment.
CONCLUSION: A WORD ABOUT METHODOLOGY
The strict liability theory of impeachment lives on, though it has been
rejected, repeatedly, throughout our history. The attraction of the strict
liability theory of impeachment is that it requires little or no discretion, little or
no thought. It operates as a flat rule: if you cross this line, if you make that
decision, then you will be removed.
The evidence is overwhelmingly against an interpretation of the Constitution
as sanctioning either a single style of judging or a strict liability theory of
impeachment. Evidence instead supports a substantive concept of judicial
independence that protects judges in their individual (and collective) decision
making. The proponents of a lower standard of removal fail to acknowledge
the many comments from George Mason and others about the importance of
insulating judges from majoritarian retaliation. Indeed, there is strong
evidence indicating that the Framers sought to prohibit removal solely on a
122
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political basis. A purely political impeachment was, in their view, one that
sought to gain a political or partisan advantage. Many advocates of this lower
impeachment standard point to the fact that there have been numerous
impeachments based on disagreements with judges’ substantive decisions. Yet
none of these impeachment attempts were successful. Their mistake is in
conflating an unsuccessful argument with established precedent. This is akin
to arguing that because some senators have previously argued that a simple
majority of the Senate has the right to change Senate rules whenever it suits
them, there is now a precedent for a simple majority to change the Senate
rules. There is a step missing from this logic, to say the least. No doubt, some
will always argue that an impeachment premised on a claim of judicial error is
constitutional. They will claim that only one method of interpreting the
Constitution is constitutionally acceptable. And there will continue to be
numerous problems associated with this claim, including the failure of the
Framers or Ratifiers to say as much, and the failure of every generation of
Americans (and Justices) to accept the claim.
Ironically, the assertion that the Constitution permits a lower standard for
impeaching judges is inconsistent with a strict construction of the Constitution.
According to a strict construction, the federal government has limited powers.
Yet Republicans and others who maintain we have a lower threshold for
removing judges than presidents are, in effect, claiming expanded federal
powers.
Moreover, some proponents of a lower standard of impeachment for judges
ignore a major contradiction in their logic. In supporting the impeachment and
removal of Bill Clinton, many members of Congress and some scholars
maintained that there was only one standard of impeachment. 129 Yet, some are
now claiming that there is a different standard – indeed, a lower one – for
impeaching or removing judges than there is for a president. We expect the
Constitution to say the same thing about the standards of impeachment,
regardless of the officials targeted for impeachment or removal. The standard
should not change out of convenience. If the Constitution posits different
standards for impeaching and removing judges than for presidents, then those
standards ought not to change depending on how much we like or dislike the
officials to whom they are being applied.
In various public fora, some Republican leaders and many conservative
scholars have insisted for years that constitutional interpretation ought not
depend on the interpreter’s personal or partisan preferences. Neither this
admonition nor the practice to which it refers is new. It is common for critics

129 See, e.g., Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison, Analysis of the Articles of Impeachment (1999),
reprinted in 145 CONG. REC. S1457, 1469 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999) (“[T]he [impeachment]
standards are set by the Constitution for all officers of the Federal government. They are
precisely the same, and we are obligated to apply them evenly.”); 145 CONG. REC. S1337,
1338 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1999) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (“To conclude that the
standard of Presidential truthfulness is lower than that of a Federal judge is absurd.”).
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to deride any judicial decisions with which they disagree as based not in law,
but on the judges’ personal preferences. But an even older principle remains:
the principle of judicial independence guaranteed by our Constitution. This
principle protects judges, both individually and collectively, from political
attacks masquerading as principled constitutional interpretation, regardless of
the party of the attackers or of a judge’s nominating President.

